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Much has been written over the course of the last few years on the ‘parting of 
ways’ of the United States and the European countries on the themes of global 
security, war on terror and rogue states.1 A number of commentators have argued that 
the transatlantic relationship, which had gone through highs and lows since the end of 
the Cold War, is now undergoing a very significant rift, particularly when it comes to 
dealing with the Middle East.  
 According to such commentators, the unilateralism of American foreign policy 
during the Bush administration simply accelerated what is inevitable: the attempt of 
the European Union, once it found its own internal coherence on matters of foreign 
and security policy, to balance the unipolar activism of the United States. Asmus for 
instance argues that the Atlantic Alliance has collapsed2 and Neuhold seems to agree 
that the rift is very significant.3 Policy-makers themselves, on both sides of the 
Atlantic, have been busy working on repairing such a rift.  Other scholars prefer a 
more nuanced analysis and argue that the alliance is not broken, but simply strained 
and that such strains have often occurred in the past as well. However, this rift seems 
to be viewed as qualitatively different. In the past, we did not really have a coherent 
European position on matters of international politics and security, while today, 
                                                 
1 See for instance Arthur Paecht (ed.), Les Relations Transatlantiques (Paris: Presse 
IRIS, 2003) or, more recently, Tuomas Forsberg and Graeme P. Herde, Divided West. 
European security and the Transatlantic Relationship (London: Blackwell, 2006).    
2 Ronald Asmus, ‘Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance’, Foreign Affairs, 82 (2003), pp. 
20-31.  
3 Hans Peter Neuhold, ‘Transatlantic Turbulences’: Rift or Ripples?’, European 
Foreign Affairs Review, 8 (2003), pp. 458-468.    
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through CFSP, this is no longer the case. While intra-European differences exist, the 
EU as a whole is a much more coherent actor. Despite disagreements about the depth 
of the Atlantic crisis, there is a consensus on the origins of it.  
The crisis is said to stem from profound constitutive differences that exist on 
the two continents that lead the EU to prefer soft diplomacy, constructive engagement 
and multilateralism, while the US prefers to stamp its authority on world affairs more 
forcefully and unilaterally. The recent conflict in Iraq has been understood and 
examined along those lines. In fact, so the argument goes, if there is an area of the 
world where the transatlantic relationship has broken down it is the Middle East/North 
Africa, with the US adopting a very forceful pro-democracy promotion attitude, 
coupled with a strong support for Israel and for military intervention if necessary, 
while the European Union, both rhetorically and through some concrete measures, 
adopts a more pro-Palestinian stance and softer approach to democracy promotion, 
which is built on economic integration and civil society nurturing. The seemingly 
radically different world-views that both actors subscribe to can be inferred quite 
clearly from the security strategies that both actors recently put forth. How 
international actors ‘promote democracy abroad’ is very significant because, contrary 
to what was previously held by the literature on democratization, the international 
dimension matters in determining the development of domestic politics in 
authoritarian regimes.4      
                                                 
4 See for instance Jeffrey Haynes, ‘Comparative Politics and Globalisation’, European 
Political Science, 2 (2003), pp. 17-26; Hakan Yilmaz, ‘External-Internal Linkages in 
Democratization: Developing an Open Model of Democratic Change’, 
Democratization, 9 (2002), pp. 67-84 and Francesco Cavatorta, ‘The International 
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The main objective of this paper is to discuss the security strategies and 
policies of both the US and the EU in the context of a North Africa country often 
ignored by the literature on the Middle East, but that is a key actor in the region and a 
potential paradigm of how relations between the US, the EU and Arab states could 
develop in the future. In this respect, we challenge the conventional wisdom 
surrounding the assumption that a rift in the transatlantic relationship exists. Our 
contentions is that despite minor tactical differences over methods, timing and 
‘reach’, the United States and the European Union have virtually the same objectives 
in the region, operate under the same ideological assumptions, are bound by the same 
constraints and fall victim of similar contradictions. The level of economic, cultural 
and military integration between the US and the EU is such that rifts are no more than 
very short and superficial temporary crises. The global dominance that the two actors 
achieved over the last few decades through mutual cooperation is therefore unlikely to 
be undermined by conflict and competition. In order to test such a proposition the 









                                                                                                                                            
Context of Morocco’s Stalled Democratization’, Democratization, 12 (2005), pp. 548-
566.  
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US democracy promotion in the Middle East 
US democracy promotion after September 11 20015 
One of the most unanticipated aspects of the presidency of George W. Bush 
has been its association with the discourse of democracy promotion in the Middle 
East. Bush’s accession to the office in 2000 was met with the expectation of a more 
isolationist and realist foreign policy that than conducted by his predecessor. The 
stated concerns of then National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice lay with the 
traditional foci of US foreign policy, namely Russia and China, and there was some 
expectation that the new administration would adopt a much more low-key approach 
to the problems of the Middle East than that of Bill Clinton. The attacks of September 
11, 2001 changed all of this. One of the critical effects of those events was to direct 
American attention to the causes of the attacks and one of the conclusions that 
emerged from this reflection was that the absence of democracy in the Middle 
East/North Africa was now a primary concern of the United States. In the words of 
one commentator, it became necessary to ‘drain the swamp’ that incubated Islamist 
radicals such as Osama bin Laden.6 In the period immediately after September 11, the 
Bush administration turned to its autocratic allies in the Middle East7. But, over the 
                                                 
5 For a study of US democracy promotion prior to 2001, see Michael Cox, G. John 
Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi (eds), American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, 
Strategies, and Impacts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 
6 Steven Cook, ‘The Right Way to Promote Arab Reform’, Foreign Affairs, 84 
(2005), pp. 91-102. See also Dennis Ross, ‘The Middle East Predicament’, Foreign 
Affairs, 84 (2005), pp. 61-74. 
7 Thomas Carothers observes acerbically that this initial policy turn did not sacrifice 
any US commitment to democracy since for decades the US had already suppressed 
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course of time, a chorus of voices within and around the administration began to 
question the value of reliance on America’s ‘friendly tyrants’.8 Carothers notes that 
the core idea of the new approach was to undercut the roots of Islamic extremism by 
‘getting serious’ about democracy in the Arab world, not just in a slow, gradual way, 
but with ‘fervour and force’.9 
Since this time, there have been a number of key U.S. initiatives and 
declarations in support of democracy and the protection of human rights. In December 
2002, the US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, launched the Middle East Partnership 
Initiative (MEPI) to address the need for political reform in the region. The MEPI 
placed the United States, he asserted, ‘firmly on the side of change, of reform, and of 
a modern future for the Middle East’.10 
Almost a year later, in a keynote address to the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED) in Washington, President Bush spoke at large on the subject of 
democracy in the Middle East. The Middle East, where ‘democracy had not yet taken 
root’, tested US commitment to democracy. In response to this, Bush announced a 
                                                                                                                                            
such concerns in the region, valuing autocratic stability for the sake of various 
strategic and economic interests. Thomas Carothers, ‘Promoting Democracy and 
Fighting Terror’, Foreign Affairs, 82 (2003), pp. 84-104.  
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Colin Powell, ‘The US-Middle East Partnership Initiative: Building Hope for the 
Years Ahead’, The Heritage Foundation, December 12, 2002. See 
www.heritage.org/research/middleast/hl772.cfm. Accessed on April 10th, 2005.  
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new policy – ‘a forward strategy for freedom in the Middle East’.11 In doing so, he 
established a clear linkage between the security of the US and the promotion of 
‘freedom’ in the region: 
 
‘Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in 
the Middle East did nothing to make us safe – because in the long run, stability cannot 
be purchased at the expense of liberty’. 
 
This was followed by the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative 
(BMENA) which was launched at the G-8 Summit Meeting of industrialized nations 
plus Russia, at Sea Island, Georgia in June 2004. The initiative was seen as a further 
attempt to give substance to the President’s ‘ringing call for a democratic 
                                                 
11 Bush, George W., ‘Freedom in Iraq and Middle East’, Remarks at the 20th 
Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, Washington, DC., November 6, 2003. See  
www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/26019.htm. Accessed on April 10th, 2005. Also in 2003, 
Richard Haass, then at the Department of State, noted that countries with ‘closed 
political systems’ could breed the kinds of ‘extremists and terrorists who target the 
US for supporting the regimes under which they live. ‘Towards Greater Democracy in 
the Muslim World’, The Washington Quarterly, 26 (2003), pp. 137-148. However, 
others reject the argument that democracy prevents terrorism, e.g., Dmitri K. Simes, 
‘America’s Imperial Dilemma’, Foreign Affairs, , 82 (2003), pp. 9-102 ; F. Gregory 
Gause, ‘Can Democracy Stop Terrorism’, Foreign Affairs, 84 (2005), pp. 62-76. 
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transformation of the Middle East’12 on the basis of the universal values of human 
dignity, freedom, democracy, rule of law, economic opportunity, and social justice. 
The new US thinking on democracy and political reform in the Middle East 
has been represented as constituting a paradigm shift both by its architects and by 
many commentators. John Lewis Gaddis argued that it should be clear by now that 
President Bush was serious about his claim that ‘the world will not be safe from 
terrorists until the Middle East is safe for democracy’.13 Such a claim was neither 
‘rhetorical nor a cloak for hidden motives.14 Others, including Daniel Neep, suggested 
that the policy represented a ‘new direction’ in US thinking. In the past, commitment 
to freedom was usually instrumental in nature and adopted ‘to provide an ideological 
basis for America’s sometimes grubby Realpolitik’.15 The new thinking, according to 
Neep, emerged from a combination of factors: a rethinking of the view that the 
Middle East was inherently resistant to democratic impulses together with a new 
focus on the apparent emergence of indigenous civil society groups in the region. The 
possibility of democracy in the Middle East neatly fed into the post- September 11 
analysis that democratic reform would provide an escape valve for some of the 
mounting political pressures in the region before they reached critical mass, as well as 
                                                 
12 Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, ‘The Greater Middle East Initiative: Off to 
a False Start’. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief no. 29, 
March 2004, pp. 1-8.  
13John Lewis Gaddis, ‘Grand Strategy in the Second Term’, Foreign Affairs, 84 
(2005), pp. 2-15.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Daniel Neep, ‘Dilemmas of Democratization in the Middle East: The ‘Forward 
Strategy of Freedom’’, Middle East Policy, 11 (2004), pp. 73-84.  
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defusing some anti-American sentiment by removing the grounds for criticism of US 
foreign policy as hypocritical. 
The aftermath of the US led invasion of Iraq in 2003 has seen a renewal of US 
commitment to political reform in the Middle East. In his second inaugural address of 
January 2005, President Bush reiterated the policy of the US 
 
‘to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in 
every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world’.16 
 
Several months later, his Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice repeated the 
commitment in a speech at the American University of Cairo.17  
However, while the increasingly threadbare nature of initial US justifications 
for the invasion, (weapons of mass destruction, the Iraq-Al-Qaeda ‘link’), rendered 
the language of democracy promotion an attractive fall-back for the administration, 
the renewal of that commitment stemmed from an analysis of the September 11 
attacks.18 
                                                 
16‘President Bush Sworn-In To Second Term’, Available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural/. Accessed on October 25th 2006 
17 In her speech, Rice echoed the tones of Bush’s 2003 speech at the NED: ‘For 60 
years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense of democracy in 
this region here in the Middle East -- and we achieved neither’ ‘Remarks at the 
American University in Cairo’, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/48328.htm. 
Accessed on October 25th 2006. 
18 See Jeffrey Kopstein, ‘The Transatlantic Divide Over Democracy Promotion’, The 
Washington Quarterly, 29 (2006), pp. 85-98. 
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The US and its critics 
There is then considerable consensus that the events of September 11 2001 
have led to new thinking on political reform in the Middle East and ‘an entirely new 
set of political and policy dynamics’.19  However, not everybody shares such benign 
view of the new initiatives and a range of criticisms has been directed at them. Neep’s 
study of the workings of the MEPI has characterised it as ‘incoherent’ in approach; 
supportive of ‘regime-led economic development.’20 Secondly, despite the stated 
intention of the framers of the MEPI, the vast majority of grants (over 70%) were 
directed towards programs that either directly benefited Arab government agencies or 
provided training and seminars for government officials. Only 18% of funds went to 
Arab or Arab non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The authors of the study 
suggest that, as a result, the MEPI is effectively choosing to support the existing Arab 
regimes’ chosen strategy of ‘controlled liberalization.’ However, the greatest obstacle 
to effective promotion of democratic reform identified in the report is the ‘continued 
lack of high-level policy support from senior officials across the Administration.’21 
                                                 
19 ‘Statement by Kenneth Wollack, President,  National Democratic Institute for 
International Affairs,  Before the Committee on International Relations   
Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia,  U.S. House of Representatives’, 
May 4, 2005. Available at www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/109/wol050405.pdf. 
Accessed on October 25th 2006. 
20 Neep, ‘Dilemmas of Democratization’.  
21 Ibid. The authors cite, for instance, the failure of President Bush to raise the 
question of political reform with President Mubarak of Egypt during their March 2003 
meeting at Bush’s Crawford ranch, despite landmark references to reform and 
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The Broader Middle East and North Africa initiative, although less clearly 
focused than the MEPI, has also come in for stringent criticism. The ‘initiative’ like 
the MEPI, was trumpeted as giving substance to the Bush administration’s call for a 
democratic transformation of the Middle East. While the MEPI related specifically to 
US activities in the region, the BMENA sought to bring together the US, Europe and 
the ‘broader’ Middle East, including Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, Pakistan and Turkey, as 
well as the Arab world. But, like the MEPI, the BMENA initiative is deeply flawed, 
so much so that it has been characterized as ‘hollow at the core’.22  
The key difficulty with the initiative is that security issues have been kept of 
the table. The background document of the Sea Island Summit, at which the BMENA 
was launched, acknowledges that the resolution of the ‘Israel-Palestine conflict’ is an 
important element of progress in the region. But, ‘regional conflicts must not be an 
obstacle for reforms’.23 However, as Ottaway and Carothers note, the decision to keep 
                                                                                                                                            
democracy in the two leaders’ prepared statement to the press. Instead, Bush ‘fixated’ 
upon Israel’s proposal to withdraw from the Gaza Strip. 
22 See Ottaway and  Carothers, ‘The Greater Middle East Initiative.’  
23 Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader 
Middle East and North Africa, Sea Island, Georgia, June 9, 2004. See 
www.g8usa.gov/d_060904c.htm. Accessed on April 10th, 2005. Note also Bush’s 
remarks on Palestine to the National Endowment for Democracy, when he identified 
‘Palestinian leaders who block and undermine democratic reform’ as the ‘main 
obstacles to peace’, and managed to make no reference either to Israel or to the 
occupation of Palestinian territories in this context, ‘Freedom in Iraq and Middle 
East’, Remarks at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, 
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the Arab-Israeli issue out of the initiative does not make it go away and the attempt to 
launch a major political initiative about Middle Eastern political transformation, 
without discussing the ‘peace process’ is fundamentally flawed.24  
However, the incoherence of the MEPI and BMENA are no more than 
symptomatic of much deeper and more significant contradictions in US policy on 
democracy promotion which are not, and perhaps cannot be, addressed in official 
pronouncements. Some of these contradictions are expressed in the implicit belief that 
the US can somehow engage as a neutral actor in relation to political change in the 
region.25  
This is related to the official refusal to recognize the extent to which American 
policies are themselves part of the problem in the Middle East. But refusal to 
recognize the relevance of US policies in relation to the Israel-Palestine question, the 
war on Iraq, and the ‘war on terror’ has the consequence that US policy-makers fail, 
or refuse, to see the extent to which the credibility of the US as an agent of democracy 
promotion in the Middle East is called into question, both within the region and 
without. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Washington, DC., November 6, 2003. See 
www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/26019.htm. Accessed on April 11th, 2005.  
24 See Ottaway and  Carothers, ‘The Greater Middle East Initiative.’ 
25 Commentators such as Dennis Ross express this view clearly. Ross expresses his 
support for the Bush administrations policy of democracy promotion ‘to counteract 
the popular anger that Islamists exploit’ without any acknowledgment that much of 
that anger is directed at what many see as the results of US policies in the first place. 
See Ross, ‘The Middle East Predicament.’ 
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Yet, as Neep observes, the US has lost all ‘moral standing in the eyes of most 
Arabs following its uncritical support for Israeli repression of the Palestinians, its 
invasion of Iraq, and the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib’.26 However, the greatest 
difficulty US policy on democracy promotion faces in the post-September 11 2001 era 
stems from the logic of the ‘war on terrorism’. The National Security Strategy of the 
United States from the outset identifies the need to ‘strengthen alliances to defeat 
global terrorism’.27 However, herein lies the problem. Most commentators are agreed 
that the most obvious beneficiaries of political liberalization in the Middle East would 
be Islamist, and to a lesser extent, nationalist opposition forces. For example, Gause 
argues that further democratization in the Middle East would 
 
‘most likely generate Islamist governments less inclined to cooperate with the 
United States on important policy goals…’28 
 
                                                 
26 Neep, ‘Dilemmas of Democratization’. See also Steven Everts, ‘The ultimate test 
case: can Europe and America forge a joint strategy in the wider Middle East?’ 
International Affairs, 80 (2004), pp 665-686. Everts argues that ‘the United States has 
a massive image problem in the Middle East’. 
27 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p.1, The White 
House, September 2002. See www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.htm. Accessed on April 
10th, 2005.   
28 Gause, ‘Can Democracy Stop Terrorism’. In addition, Robert Jervis has made the 
same point in expressing doubt that ‘democratic regimes will always further 
American interests’. ‘Why the Bush Doctrine Cannot Be Sustained’, Political Science 
Quarterly, 120 (2005), p.370. 
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However, these are precisely the forces that would oppose not only the US war 
on terrorism but also many other aspects of US foreign policy in the region, not least 
the American position on Palestine. This means that there is a gaping contradiction at 
the heart of US democracy promotion in the Middle East. Successful promotion of 
democratic political reform clearly will benefit the enemies of the war on terror and 
the war on terror is a non-negotiable element of the foreign policy of this US 
administration. The necessary tension between maintaining the ‘global coalition’ 
against terrorism and the democracy imperative was recognized early by some. In a 
reflection on the implications of the events of September 11, 2001 for the future 
direction of US foreign policy, Stephen Walt argued that  
 
‘because the United States needs help from a number of states and groups with poor 
human rights records… the war on terrorism will require it to downgrade its concern 
for human rights temporarily’.29 
 
One of the results of this is what has been characterized as the 
‘instrumentalization’ of democracy in US foreign policy. Rather the being interested 
in democratic reform for its own sake, the US propounds democracy in the hope and 
expectation that it will deliver outcomes which the US desires. Dennis Ross, former 
Special Middle East Coordinator under Bill Clinton, advocates the promotion of 
democratization in the Middle East because ‘only the proponents of moderate Islam 
can discredit the radical Islamists’30. This inevitably raises the suspicion that 
                                                 
29 Stephen Walt, ‘Beyond bin Laden: Reshaping US Foreign Policy’, International 
Security, 26 (2001), pp. 56-78.  
30 Ross, ‘The Middle East Predicament.’ 
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democracy will be acceptable only if it delivers the right kind of Islamists to power.31 
The US reaction to the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian elections makes this point 
only too obviously. 
 
Democracy promotion and the EU 
In the light of this analysis, some commentators have turned to the role played 
by the European Union (EU) in this area and have contrasted it favourably with the 
United States. Writing in 2001, Mohamedi and Sadowski offered a favourable view of 
the capacity of the EU to ‘temper and re-channel US power globally.32 They argued 
that the policies of the EU in relation to the Mediterranean region constituted ‘a point 
of departure’ towards the end of more viable political and economic systems in the 
Middle East, which was more acceptable to Middle Eastern regimes than American 
approaches. In a similar vein, Gillespie and Youngs have suggested that, from the 
1990s onwards, the EU sought to develop policy initiatives in the area of 
democratization ‘capable of challenging Washington’s pre-eminence in this field’.33 
                                                 
31 Thomas Carothers has also warned against the dangers of ‘instrumentalisation of 
pro-democracy policies – wrapping security goals in the language of democracy 
promotion and then confusing democracy promotion with the search for particular 
outcomes that enhance those security goals.’ See Thomas Carothers, ‘Promoting 
Democracy.’ 
32 Fareed Mohamedi and Yahya Sadowski, ‘The Decline (But Not Fall) of US 
Hegemony in the Middle East’, Middle East Report, 2001, p.20. 
33 Richard Gillespie and Richard Youngs, ‘Themes in European Democracy 
Promotion’ in Gillespie and Youngs (eds), The European Union and Democracy 
Promotion: the Case of North Africa (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 5. See also the  
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Origins 
Most commentators trace the beginnings of a coherent effort to define a 
common EU policy on democratization to the post-Cold War period of the early 
1990s and the articulation of a ‘European’ foreign policy in the form of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The principles of the CFSP became part of the 
European Union Treaty, the Treaty of Maastricht, which was ratified in 1993, and was 
carried unchanged into the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997.34 In this post-Cold War setting 
a number of new themes became prominent, among them the values of democracy 
and human rights. European politicians began to assert a link between economic 
development and political freedom and democracy. In November 1991, the then 12 
member states adopted a resolution which established democracy and respect for 
human rights as conditions for receiving European development aid.35 From 1991 
onwards, a Development Council resolution committed the EU to placing democracy 
promotion and human rights at the heart of its foreign policy.36  The Maastricht Treaty 
of 1993 stressed the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law 
and adherence to human rights and fundamental freedoms as important aims of EU 
development policy.  
The single most significant development in terms of EU democracy promotion 
in the Middle East and North Africa came in 1995 with the inauguration in Barcelona 
of the European-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). The then 15 member states of the 
EU together with 12 Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) committed themselves, 
                                                 
34 Gorm Rye Olsen, ‘Promotion of Democracy as a Foreign Policy Instrument of 
‘Europe’: Limits to International Idealism’, Democratization, 7 (2000), p.143. 
35 Ibid, p.145. 
36 Gillespie and Youngs, ‘Themes in European Democracy Promotion’, p.6. 
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through the Barcelona Declaration, to the task of transforming the Mediterranean into 
a region of ‘peace, stability and prosperity’.37 To this end, the EMP adopted a model 
that combines establishing bilateral association agreements between the EU and 
individual MPCs with various forms of cooperation on political, economic and 
cultural levels.  
‘The EMP’s special value, however, emanates from its normative dimension, based 
on the values of democracy and human rights’.38 
 
Critical Perspectives 
But, as with American policies on democracy promotion, the rhetoric of the 
EU in this area is belied by practice and the EMP also has been the object of very 
significant criticisms. Its development into the European Neighbourhood Policy 
seems equally unable to deliver on its promises. In the first place, a number of writers 
have observed on the lack of coherence that characterizes European interventions in 
this area. Despite attempts since the 1990s to forge a common European foreign and 
security policy, the reality is that ‘Europe is still far from being a unitary actor’.39 
Policy-making in these areas remains, for the most part, the preserve of the national 
governments of EU member states, which opens the way for separate actions by 
individual members parallel to common policies. The complex decision-making 
structures and processes of the EU further complicate efforts to achieve coherence and 
                                                 
37 Annette Junemann, ‘Security-Building in the Mediterranean After September 11’ in 
Junemann, Annette (ed), Euro-Mediterranean Relations After September 11: 
International, Regional and Domestic Dimensions (London: Frank Cass, 2004), p. 5. 
38 Ibid, p.5. 
39 Rye Olsen, ‘Promotion of Democracy’, p.146.  
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consistency in foreign policy matters. Gorm Rye Olsen points out that, at various 
levels, the Council, the Commission and to some extent the Council of the EU each 
have a remit in the area of foreign policy.40 
On a deeper level, EU policy in this area is confronted by a dilemma similar to 
that faced by the United States in the form of the tension between the objectives of 
promoting democracy and ensuring security. If there is a conflict between the 
promotion of democracy and security, the EU will give the highest priority to 
security. The clearest example of this came at a time when common EU policies in 
this area were just beginning to be formulated. The military coup in Algeria in 1992, 
which ended the process of democratization there, came just two months after the EU 
set respect for democracy and human rights as conditions for the receipt of aid. 
Despite this, EU member states remained silent as to the rights and wrongs of the 
military intervention. Moreover, at the behest of France, the EU actually increased its 
aid to Algeria.41  
 
Gillespie and Whitehead have observed that EU policy towards the 
Mediterranean is primarily driven by security objectives, which tends to lead to 
accommodation of authoritarian regimes rather than efforts to undermine them. 
                                                 
40 Ibid, p. 147. See also Ricardo Gomez, ‘The EU’s Mediterranean policy: Common 
foreign policy by the back door?’ in John Peterson and Helene Sjursen (eds), A 
Common Foreign Policy for Europe? (London: Routledge, 1998), p.133. Gomez 
points out the significant differences in approach of the French and Spanish 
Presidencies in the run up to the Barcelona Conference in 1995. 
41 Total aid from the EU and bilateral donors to Algeria doubled between 1990 and 
1994, see Rye Olsen, ‘Promotion of Democracy’, p. 156. 
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‘Thus far, European policy-makers have acted as if, whenever the spectre of radical 
Islam could be invoked, that justified back-pedalling on political reform’.42 
 
A critical difficulty for the EU is that it has limited resources at its disposal to 
compel compliance with its requirements in relation to political reform. In Southern 
and Eastern Europe the inducement of eventual membership of the EU could be held 
out. However, when Morocco applied for EU membership in 1987, the response was 
that this was impossible on geographical grounds. 
 
‘It seems that ‘Europe’ could extend eastwards to the former Soviet Union and 
beyond, and south-west to the Turkish frontier with Iraq, but it cannot incorporate 
Casablanca or Tangier’.43 
 
Nor, unlike, the United States, does the EU possess a significant common 
European and defence competence. Even if non-military instruments are held to be 
more relevant to the nature of the challenges at issue, the possibility of the US in 
                                                 
42 Richard Gillespie and Lawrence Whitehead, ‘European Democracy Promotion in 
North Africa: Limits and Prospects’ in Richard Gillespie and Richard Youngs (eds.), 
The European Union and Democracy Promotion: the Case of North Africa (London: 
Frank Cass, 2002), p.198. 
43, Ibid, p.199. See also Kopstein’s observation that the EU ‘has precious few policy 
instruments to deal with states not slated to become members in the short or medium 
term’. Kopstein, ‘The Transatlantic Divide’, p.92. 
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extremis backing up its objectives with effective force account for its being a far more 
potent influence in world affairs than the EU.44 
A number of significant consequences flow from this. In the first place, the 
EMP places great emphasis on building partnerships with governments in the region. 
Because, the EMP extends to so many areas where enhanced cooperation is sought 
 
‘it becomes very difficult to develop a democracy promotion strategy that does not 
conflict with efforts that require consent and collaboration in other areas’.45 
 
This, in turn, leads to a preference for a cautious bottom-up approach to 
political change which is expressed in support for civil society organizations. 
However, the limitations of a bottom up, gradualist approach have been made clear. 
EU strategy in this regard has been criticized for its flawed conception of civil society 
in the Middle East which is usually limited to secular, liberal groups, excluding those 
inspired by religious faith and the willingness to limit civil support to partners that are 
known to and approved of by ‘partner’ governments.46  
 
One of the primary consequences of this approach is that the EU, like the United 
States, is exposed to the charge of double standards. Chourou argues that 
 
                                                 
44 Gillespie and Youngs, ‘Themes in European Democracy Promotion’, p. 6. 
45 Ibid, p.14. 
46 Gillespie and Whitehead, ‘European Democracy Promotion in North Africa’, p.197. 
 21
‘after sifting through all the rhetoric, one can identify Europe’s three real concerns in 
the Mediterranean: oil, markets and immigration’.47  
 
However, even if the EU managed to overcome problems of coherence and 
consistency in its promotion of democracy in the Middle East, it is doubtful that EU 
policy has the potential to offer any significant alternative to that of the United States 
in the short to medium term. Despite some points of difference, usually expressed 
through rhetoric rather than actions, between the EU and the US on aspects of foreign 
policy in the region, there is little evidence of either the desire or the capacity on the 
part of the EU to do more than assert its ‘right’ to a greater role in the region, in 
partnership with, rather than in opposition to the United States. As a result, ‘the major 
powers [including European ones] and their policies are perceived by most Muslims 




Writing in 1998, Perthes noted that, in the past, Europe critiqued US policy on 
the Middle East on a number of points, including the American tendency to 
‘demonize’ certain actors in the region, its failure to act in an even-handed fashion in 
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48 Mohammed Ayoob, ‘The Future of Political Islam’, International Affairs, 81 
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relation to Israel and Palestine, and its assumption that only one external player, 
namely the US itself, could play a political role in the region. Nonetheless, he argued 
that, contrary to some Arab hopes,  
 
‘the EU and the majority of European policy makers have no intention of 
counterbalancing US policies in the Middle East.’49 This is confirmed in policy 
documents and official statements. The European Security Strategy commits the EU 
to an international order based on effective multilateralism, but multilateralism in this 
context places a particularly high value on the EU’s good relations with the United 
States. As the ESS notes: 
 
‘One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic 
relationship’.50 
 
The strategy document implicitly recognizes some of the relative weaknesses 
of the EU in foreign policy matters in asserting that a ‘more capable Europe is within 
                                                 
49 Volker Perthes, ‘Points of Difference, Cases for Coooperation: European Critiques 
of US Middle East Policy’, Middle East Report, 1998.  Perthes reasserted this point in 
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Policy, 9 (2004), pp. 85-97. 
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European Security Strategy’, Brussels, 12 December, 2003 Available at: 
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 23
our grasp, though it will take time to realize our full potential’, and in acknowledging 
the challenge ‘to bring together the different instruments and capabilities’ of the EU 
and its members in order to promote security and development.51 The important, if 
unintended effect of this, as Toje points out, is that ‘the ESS illustrates that the EU 
will continue to rely on US agenda setting’.52 More recently, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, 
the EU Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, 
has reiterated the commonality of American and European policies on the Middle 
East. 
‘…the truth is EU-US differences are routinely exaggerated and our common 
objectives stay on the plate’.53 
 
At the same press conference, President of EU Commission, Jose Barroso, 
emphasized the complementarity of EU and US approaches: ‘Does anyone really 
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think that the United States alone or Europe alone can meet the global challenge? It’s 
impossible… So let’s work together because the basic values are the same…’54 
 
Section Three: Tunisia – a missed opportunity for democratization 
The contradictions and the complementary strategies of both the EU and US foreign 
policies towards democracy promotion are in evidence when it comes to the case of 
Tunisia.  
 
At first glance, the country seems to offer the best potential for democratization in the 
entire Middle East and North Africa, which would lead one to assume that external 
forces might make a considerable difference in pressuring the leadership to end 
authoritarianism while, at the same time, promoting potential opposition actors.  
 
Tunisia has a number of advantages over other countries in the region. Lebanon and 
Yemen might also be considered ‘good’ candidates, but Lebanon is still plagued by 
sectarianism and foreign destabilising interventions (both Israel and Syria directly 
interfere in Lebanese politics), while Yemen suffers from poorer socio-economic 
indicators than Tunisia. Such advantages consist of the following:  a) its limited size 
and population mean that the country per se is not a key strategic asset for Western 
powers (unlike Morocco); b) the absence of significant natural resources further 
decreases its strategic value and therefore meddling from external actors with a high 
degree of dependence on current ruling elites (unlike the Gulf States or Algeria); c) 
the relative lack of regional standing and cultural influence do not make Tunisian 
politics as internationally relevant as Egyptian politics; d) the absence of a credible 
                                                 
54 Ibid. 
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Islamist threat would seem ideal for the opening up of the political system given that 
the Tunisian Islamists had been interlocutors of Bin Ali’s during his first year as 
President55; e) recent solid economic growth has contributed to the rise of a 
moderately wealthy middle class and created a potentially vibrant civil society. All 
this should represent a clear advantage on all the other countries in the region and it 
would therefore seem that if both the EU and the US were seriously promoting 
democracy, Tunisia would be the perfect ‘target country’ on which to apply pressure 
for change. However, not only this does not happen, but over the course of the last 
decade the rule of Bin Ali has been strengthened and, paradoxically, his police state 
has come to represent the paradigm of what other countries in the region should aspire 
to in order to satisfy the governance requirements of the US and the European Union. 
 Focusing on the external dimension as a ‘reinforcer’ of authoritarianism in 
Tunisia does not automatically marginalise ‘domestic’ explanations regarding the 
ability of the regime to remain highly authoritarian. Béatrice Hibou for instance points 
out that the control of economic levers by the leader and his security apparatus allow 
for the exercise of unrestrained power given that the merchant classes and the rising 
middle classes profit economically by rallying to the regime rather than from 
confronting it.56 Similarly, Emma Murphy57 and Stephen King58 convincingly argue 
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that the lack of political democratisation can be related to the hijacking of economic 
liberalisation, which strengthens authoritarianism rather than weakening it. What is 
contended here is that external actors facilitated such reinforcement of authoritarian 
rule by decreasing the costs of repression of the regime to such an extent that the 
paradox is that the regime is today rewarded precisely for remaining authoritarian.  
 
The Tunisian Political System 
For a year or so after coming to power in a bloodless coup in November 1987, it 
seemed that Bin Ali was setting about transforming the country and directing it away 
from its authoritarian past and towards a more inclusive and democratic future. One of 
his very first political moves was in fact to launch a political pact for democratization 
among all the political movements and parties that were active in Tunisia at the time 
including the Islamists.59  However, ‘as soon as he entrenched his stranglehold on the 
reins of power, he discarded the more formidable opponents’60 and began to set up a 
façade democracy that has all the institutions and ‘formalities’ of a liberal-democratic 
state without having any of its content. 
  
                                                                                                                                            
58 Stephen King, Liberalisation Against Democracy: the local politics of economic 
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The Tunisian political system, its authoritarianism and the role of Bin Ali in hijacking 
the country’s institutions have been quite widely detailed61 and it is not the purpose of 
this paper to recount his story in detail. It suffices to say that since 1987, Bin Ali has 
been the linchpin of an authoritarian system that has enjoyed the support of the 
international community and the lauds of prominent European and American 
politicians. How is this possible in an era when democracy promotion has been at the 
top of the foreign policy agenda of all western powers and the international 
organizations they control?  
 
 It’s the economy stupid! 
As mentioned earlier, one of the pillars of European democracy promotion in the 
region has been economic integration. While not offering the prospect of membership, 
the European Union believes that pro-market economic reforms will have beneficial 
repercussions in terms of democratization on authoritarian regimes. The logic 
therefore of partnership prevails among EU policy-makers who claim that it is 
through economic engagement that political developments will occur. In this context, 
grants and aid are offered to the target country to make the reforms necessary to be 
able to ‘integrate’ the regional economic exchanges. Such logic is based on the theory 
that economic advantages, which will inevitably occur in the target country after a 
period of ‘adaptation’, will create new centres of independent power that will make 
demands on the political system to reform and accommodate through democratic 
procedures the ‘demands’ of new sectors of society. The European Union links with 
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Tunisia, which have seen the two actors sign an Association Agreement, have 
partially reflected the validity of such a theoretical construct. In the decade form 
1995, Tunisia has made considerable economic progress and most economic 
indicators are better than for most of its regional neighbours.   
 
Valentin Mbougueng, who argued in 1999 that we were witnessing the arrival on the 
world scene of the ‘desert tiger’, has examined Tunisian economic success in some 
detail.62 With respect to the support and crucial role of the European Union in terms 
of fostering Tunisian economic success, Testas argues that EU investment has led to 
higher level of total investment in the country and a development of greater economic 
activity.63  
 
This economic development has however not generated significant repercussions at 
the political level in terms of credible democratization or even liberalization. The 
recent creation of a second chamber devoid of any power seems to have been 
executed simply to satisfy the need for the EU to ‘tick a box’ when it comes to 
highlight democratic improvements in a partner country.  
 
If anything, the newfound economic success has led Bin Ali to further restrict political 
access to different groups in society in order to negate the possibility of debating the 
important social and economic issues that the boom has created. For instance, much 
                                                 
62 Valentin Mbougueng, Bin Ali et le Modèle Tunisien, (Paris: Editions de l’Orient, 
1999).  
63 Abdelaziz Testas, ‘The Contribution of EU Investment to Tunisia’s Economic 
Development’, Journal of North African Studies, 5 (2000), pp. 9-24. 
 29
of the improved economic indicators fail to highlight the unfair distribution of wealth, 
which sees those close to the regime benefiting from rents to the detriment of large 
sectors of the work force. In addition, access to consumer goods has certainly led to a 
higher standard of living, but with very heavy personal levels of debt. This risks 
becoming a problem in case of economic downturn, something that is already 
occurring in light of higher energy prices and de-localization away from Tunisia to 
other more profitable parts of the world. All these issues have therefore become a 
potential bone of contention for the regime and the political opposition in all its 
guises, which leads the regime to crack down harshly and impedes any movement 
away from authoritarian rule as the theory predicted. 
 
The EU however is not disturbed and continues to praise Bin Ali and his efforts to 
modernize the country. The very logic of a neo-liberal economic integration that 
strongly favours European businesses over Tunisian ones (agriculture is excluded 
from the Association Agreement) and the enforcement of rules/regulations that are 
perceived to be unfair by sectors of Tunisian society make an alliance with Bin Ali 
necessary. There is very little incentive for the European Union to use the human 
rights clauses that are present in the agreement to punish Tunisia because the 
economic benefits that the EU now derives from the relationship might be jeopardized 
with a change at the top.  Some data will suffice to highlight the positive outcomes 
that exist for the European Union when it comes to economic exchanges with Tunisia.  
The EU represents by far the largest market for Tunisian goods (78.6% in 
2002 rising to 84% in 2005) and the EU is also the primary exporter to Tunisia with 
70.3% of goods in 2002, rising to 72% in 2005, coming from EU countries. The 
balance of payments heavily favours the EU, which had a surplus of almost 4 million 
 30
Tunisian dinars in 2002. In addition, it should be highlighted that the EU also donates 
78.4% (2002) of all foreign aid to the country.64 The EU itself states that ‘Tunisia is 
one of the key beneficiaries of financial co-operation in the Mediterranean, because, 
thanks to its absorption capacity, it has received around 13% of the MEDA budget 
while having only 4% of the population of the Mediterranean region.’65 Finally, it 
should be noted that while Tunisia is highly dependent on the EU, Tunisian goods 
represent a risible percentage of EU imports. All this shows how strong the hand of 
the European Union is vis a vis Tunisia. It is therefore all the more surprising, if we 
are to take the EU rhetoric at face value regarding democratisation and human rights, 
that the EU is incapable of pressurising Bin Ali’s regime into promoting serious 
liberalising and democratising reforms. A more convincing explanation for the 
absence of pressure rests on the EU’s interest to fully integrate Tunisia in the 
economic ‘region’ the EU is building in the Mediterranean. This region sees the EU 
itself as the central actor and main beneficiary of the liberal reforms occurring in third 
countries. It is again no surprise that in the National Indicative Programme for Tunisia 
published by the EU in 2005, the vast bulk of the money the EU provides (48.6%) is 
destined to strengthen economic reforms and market economy institutions, with the 
rest going to human resources development (such as vocational training) and to 
economic infrastructure. There is almost nothing in the Indicative Programme about 
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human rights and democratisation aside from a brief statement about the EU’s belief 
in the promotion of democracy and respect for human rights as core objectives.      
In its 2006 report on Tunisia, Amnesty International for example indicates the 
following: a) ‘Freedom of expression remained severely curtailed’; b) ‘Human rights 
defenders continued to face harassment and sometimes physical violence’, c) ‘judges’ 
activities and right to freedom of expression were further restricted’.66 At the more 
general political level, Bin Ali’s control over the political system has allowed him to 
modify the constitution to enable him being re-elected to the post of President despite 
an original ban on more than two mandates. Opposition parties are not permitted and 
the popular Islamist party is still outlawed. All this occurs despite the legal obligations 
in the Association Agreement with the EU to respect human rights and promote 
democratisation. The EU has never punished Tunisia by enforcing the human rights 
clauses present in the Agreement.      
EU policy-making towards Tunisia indicates quite clearly that material 
interests are more important than democratisation and human rights despite the 
rhetorical commitment to it in both the European Security Strategy and the region-
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The European Union has been traditionally more reluctant to co-operate openly and 
directly when it comes to hard security issues, but “ the terrorist attacks of 11 
September, the Djerba tragedy, and the numerous arrests all over Europe have 
triggered an intense debate in Europe about internal and external security measures in 
the fight against terrorism.’ In this context, Tunisia is a primary ally because of the 
expertise of its secret police and its ability in dismantling its own domestic Islamist 
network. It is therefore no surprise that the European Union Counter-Terrorism 
Coordinator announced much tighter co-operation with all the North African 
governments.67 While this might make sense from a strictly security-related point of 
view in the short-term, it should not be forgotten that it is precisely the Tunisian 
security and intelligence services that are to blame for their hold on the political 
system and their repression of all domestic opposition, thereby undermining the long-
term democratisation requirements the EU purports to promote.  
On its part, the United States has been much more active in deepening the 
links with the Tunisian regime with a view to strengthen its coalition against terror. 
The threat of Islamism in Tunisia does indeed exist, but not in the extremist and 
violent forms that make the headlines these days. In spite of this, the United States 
supports the heavy-handed practices of Bin Ali and Tunisia has become an important 
ally in the war on terror. Since 11 September 2001, contacts between the two 
countries have reached unprecedented depth, with Former Secretary of State Powell 
visiting Tunisia in 2003 and Tunisian Foreign Minister visiting Washington in 2004.  
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During that visit the US State Department declared that ‘Tunisia has been a voice for 
moderation. Tunisia has been a voice for regional harmony. Tunisia has been a voice 
for putting efforts and resources into development.’68   
On its part, the Tunisian government asserts that ‘Tunisia and the United 
States have been strengthened within the framework of common adherence to the 
values of liberty, democracy and free enterprise.’69 The strength of these days was 
confirmed when Bin Ali visited Washington in February 2004 and President Bush 
lauded him for his efforts in the fight against terrorism.70 As we can see, at the heart 
of US-Tunisian relations it should be the democratization of the country because, 
according to the Bush doctrine, it is only through democracy that terrorism will be 
ultimately defeated according to the Bush administration, but this does not happen. In 
fact, co-operation occurs in the military and intelligence domains,71 while MEPI 
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funding does not appear to make any impact on the Tunisian political system.  Again, 
short-term goals override such long-term beliefs.  
              
The EU and the US share the same objective and therefore their democracy-
promotion strategies are bound to fail. The maintenance of the international status 
quo, the enforcement of neo-liberal economic arrangements and the absolute control 
over the definition of what constitutes security make it impossible for these two actors 
to credibly promote democracy as the probable outcome is likely to throw up parties 
and movements that would contest precisely such objectives. Previous experiences are 
not encouraging in this sense. The FIS victory in the Algerian election in December 
1991 were greeted with stunned preoccupation in Western capital and the subsequent 
military coup depriving the FIS of power was hailed in the West as the means to save 
democracy.72 The more recent case of the shunning of Hamas obeys to the same logic 
of ‘boycotting’ what democracy in the region produces because it does not conform to 
the EU and US vision of international peace and security. Thus, in terms of obtaining 
both security and material gains, Tunisia provides the perfect paradigmatic partner: 
economically integrated, but non-threatening (unlike the Asian tigers), co-operative 
on security matters, but not ‘devious’ (unlike Saudi Arabia or Pakistan), militarily 
weak and accommodating, but sufficiently strong to withstand potential Islamist 
pressure, and finally, docile when it comes to the Arab-Israeli conflict. If only the 
whole of the Arab world could be just like Tunisia… 
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Conclusion 
On a general, and regional, level, the asserted existence of a transatlantic rift 
seems to suggest that a ‘softer’ and meaningful alternative to US realpolitik in the 
Middle East exists, in the form of EU policies. All the evidence, as this paper has 
argued, is to the contrary. The strategies of both the US and the EU, despite some 
rhetorical differences, show very similar contradictions and inconsistencies because, 
fundamentally, they are both preoccupied with maintaining the status quo in the 
absence of a ‘reliable’ and pliable political opposition in the region. Those who argue 
that the rift between the US and the EU is irreparable and bound to characterise 
international politics in the future seem to miss the mark.     
In addition, the evidence gathered indicates that the promotion of democracy, 
irrespective of the intentions of its promoters, takes the backseat when confronted 
with more ‘realist’ goals. While this might be satisfactory in the short-term as it seems 
to guarantee a positive outcome for both the EU and the US, the long-term effects of 
such a choice might be much more problematic. Specifically, all of the double-talk 
about democracy in the Middle East and North Africa has profound and negative 
domestic implications. In a country such as Tunisia, (but also in Egypt and 
elsewhere), it gives false hope to local activists and actors, while doing next to 
nothing to undo the structures which preclude meaningful popular political 
participation. In turn, this has three further effects. First, it brings the whole idea and 
the ‘ideal’ of democracy into disrepute thereby legitimising the ideological discourse 
of those who articulate the rejection of democratic governance. Second, it further 
diminishes the credibility of the United States and other Western actors as 
promoters/supporters of democracy in the region. Thus, even those who are 
favourable to a Western-style democracy feel compelled to distance themselves from 
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its external proponents. This makes both the US and the EU lose important 
constituencies.  Finally, and paradoxically, the incumbent regimes continue to enjoy 
all the fruits of office, unchallenged by the very policies ostensibly designed as their 
undoing.  
